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Early abstract reasoning has typically been characterized by a “re-
lational shift,” in which children initially focus on object features but
increasingly come to interpret similarity in terms of structured rela-
tions. An alternative possibility is that this shift reflects a learned
bias, rather than a typical waypoint along a universal developmen-
tal trajectory. If so, consistent differences in the focus on objects or
relations in a child’s learning environment could create distinct pat-
terns of relational reasoning, influencing the type of hypotheses
that are privileged and applied. Specifically, children in the United
States may be subject to culture-specific influences that bias their
reasoning toward objects, to the detriment of relations. In experi-
ment 1, we examine relational reasoning in a population with less
object-centric experience—3-y-olds in China—and find no evidence
of the failures observed in the United States at the same age. A
second experiment with younger and older toddlers in China (18
to 30 mo and 30 to 36 mo) establishes distinct developmental tra-
jectories of relational reasoning across the two cultures, showing a
linear trajectory in China, in contrast to the U-shaped trajectory that
has been previously reported in the United States. In a third exper-
iment, Chinese 3-y-olds exhibit a bias toward relational solutions in an
ambiguous context, while those in the United States prefer object-
based solutions. Together, these findings establish population-
level differences in relational bias that predict the developmental
trajectory of relational reasoning, challenging the generality of an
initial object focus and suggesting a critical role for experience.
cognitive development | relational reasoning | learning | culture
The ability to engage in relational reasoning is often cited as adefining feature of human cognition (1). Nevertheless, de-
cades of research reports that young learners tend to struggle
with relational abstraction (e.g., ref. 2). According to the pre-
vailing view, this is because children’s early similarity judgments
are dominated by shared object properties and surface features.
Then, over the course of development, they expand their un-
derstanding of similarity to include relational information (i.e.,
the “relational shift”; e.g., refs. 3–5).
In contrast, recent evidence suggests that the foundations for re-
lational reasoning are in place much earlier than previously believed
(6–9). In particular, preverbal infants (3 to 9 mo, depending on the
task) distinguish the relations “same” and “different,” looking longer at
novel pairs of objects that differ from the habituated relation (6, 10).
There is also extensive evidence for early recognition of relational
patterns at this age (e.g., refs. 11–14). Even stronger evidence has been
found in toddlers (18 to 30 mo), who infer these abstract concepts in a
causal version of a relational reasoning task (i.e., matching AA′ with
BB′, not CD, and matching EF with CD, not BB′; see Fig. 1 and refs. 8,
9, and 15) and apply them in generating novel actions. How might we
resolve the apparent conflict between this early relational competence
and the decades of research documenting the relational shift?
According to the relational shift account, relational reasoning is a
hallmark of general cognitive development. In this view, the acquisi-
tion of relational categories marks a key developmental change in
domains of knowledge that are initially built upon perceptually driven
concepts. As a result, this account has focused on the emergence of
relational competence over the course of development, which is supported
by the acquisition of domain-specific content knowledge (3, 4, 16), re-
lational language (e.g., ref. 17), and the maturation of domain-general
factors, like executive function (18, 19). This initially intuitive idea—that
early learning must progress from the concrete to the abstract—extends as
far back as Piaget (20). However, a strict interpretation of the relational
shift account has recently come under pressure to accommodate
growing evidence of early relational competence (6–15, 21, 22). An
alternative response to these recent challenges draws on Bayesian
accounts of the “blessing of abstraction” (i.e., hierarchical Bayesian
models; ref. 23) and corresponding empirical research (24–26), which
suggests that children’s ability to infer object-based and relational con-
cepts likely develops more or less in tandem. Based on this evidence, the
rational learner account (15) proposes that a child’s tendency to select
relational or object-based solutions has little to do with domain-specific
knowledge or general cognitive maturity, and instead depends upon the
probability assigned to each type of hypothesis in a given context.
Key differences between these accounts are highlighted in their
distinct explanations of a recent empirical puzzle: the apparent decline
in relational reasoning during early development. Specifically, while
18- to 30-mo-olds successfully infer same–different relations in the
simple causal relational reasoning task described above (Fig. 1), 3-y-
olds fail (15). Similar difficulties have been observed in 3-y-olds across
a variety of related relational reasoning tasks (e.g., refs. 3, 17, and 27−28).
Then, around 4 y of age, children again succeed in the standard re-
lational match-to-sample (RMTS) task (17) but continue to neglect
relational similarities in other contexts, even at 5 to 6 y of age (e.g., ref.
3). This pattern of early success, decline, and reemergence suggests
that the development of relational reasoning may follow a U-shaped
trajectory, rather than a continuous process of improvement, as previously
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suggested (e.g., ref. 29). What causes this curious dip in performance
around 3 y of age?
The Relational Shift “Paradox” Perspective.According to Hoyos et al.
(30), older children may fail because of a temporary object bias that is
induced by avid noun learning. The authors provide evidence consistent
with this view, in which an experimentally induced noun bias interferes
with RMTS performance in 4-y-olds, who otherwise succeed. They sug-
gest that language learning—and an emphasis on nouns in particular—
may negatively impact relational reasoning in 3-y-olds. They note, how-
ever, that earlier work (17) leads to the opposite conclusion: that the use
of linguistic concepts—in this case, relational nouns—facilitates relational
reasoning. In particular, Christie and Gentner (27) suggest that children
may not initially have access to a sufficient hypothesis space that includes
relational meanings, and instead form new relational hypotheses when
prompted to compare colabeled items. Together, these findings create
what Hoyos et al. (30) term “the paradox of relational development,” in
which some features of language acquisition orient learners away from
relations, while others provide critical scaffolding to support relational
learning. In other words, experience with language learning appears to
solve the very problem it creates.
The Rational Learner “Paradigm” Perspective. According to the ra-
tional learner account, even very young children have—and retain—
genuine same–different concepts (9) but tend to neglect relational
information as a result of a learned bias to attend to objects and their
properties (15). This claim is consistent with evidence that preschool-
aged children attend to objects and attributes (e.g., refs. 4, 17, 27, and
31) but treats this attention as preferential—an optional learned bias,
rather than a typical waypoint on the standard developmental trajec-
tory. Importantly, this computational-level account remains agnostic
about the origins of these relational representations and the processes
(or algorithms) by which these representations arise (e.g., innate,
structure mapping). What it does predict, however, is that differences
in a learner’s experience could lead to differences in which type of
existing hypotheses are privileged and ultimately applied. Accordingly,
any input that changes the distribution of prior expectations over a
learner’s hypothesis space (linguistic or otherwise) can influence
children’s inferences. In this view, consistent differences in the focus
on objects or relations in a child’s learning environment could create
distinct developmental paradigms of relational reasoning, only some
of which are U-shaped.
This alternative view draws on probabilistic models of cognitive
development, in which children are seen as Bayesian learners who
weight the likelihood of a given hypothesis (the probability of the
data given the hypothesis) by its prior probability (the probability of
the hypothesis before data are observed; ref. 32). Consequently, if a
hypothesis has high prior probability, it will require stronger evi-
dence to overturn it. This reasoning may also be applied to entire
categories of hypotheses in the form of an overhypothesis, or general
principle by which the learner assigns higher prior probability to
particular types of hypotheses over others (23, 33). From this per-
spective, the “noun explosion” in early language learning could be
one of several forms of input that lead to the formation of an
overhypothesis that temporarily privileges object-based hypotheses
over relational ones (for a discussion of language-induced over-
hypotheses and their relevance beyond language see ref. 34).
Environmental Variation as a Driver of Children’s Hypotheses. If the
dip in relational reasoning reflects an object bias that is shaped by
early experience and incidental to the overall developmental trajec-
tory, then it need not be a universal feature of early childhood. In-
stead, the observed U-shaped performance could be an artifact of
culture-specific learning environments that promote a focus on object-
based hypotheses through object-centric experience. In this case, de-
velopmental conclusions about relational reasoning may be unique to—for
instance—WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and demo-
cratic; ref. 35) samples, in which there are well-documented emphases on
decontextualized objects (36) and noun learning (37). By examining the
emergence of relational reasoning in populations that receive different
culture-specific input, it is possible to examine the potential role of con-
textual factors on the developmental trajectory of relational reasoning.
Indeed, prior work has already begun to capitalize on these dif-
ferences and provides initial evidence for variance in relational rea-
soning across contexts, although there is no clear consensus regarding
the mechanism underlying these effects (18, 38, 39). Notably, Kuwabara
and Smith (38) found that 4-y-olds in Japan outperform 4-y-olds in
the United States on RMTS and proposed that this difference may
be driven by a Japanese cultural bias to attend to relations. Richland
et al. (39) found a similar advantage when comparing analogical
reasoning between 3- and 4-y-olds in Hong Kong and the United
States on a picture-mapping task and proposed that this difference is
driven by greater inhibitory control among children in Hong Kong.
While these findings are suggestive, the differences reported between
groups are differences in the degree of success, based on children’s
overall performance. Could variation in the learning environment pro-
duce qualitative differences in performance across contexts, leading—as
the rational learner account predicts—to distinct developmental para-
digms? Or, do environmental factors merely modulate a common
trajectory—that is, the relational shift—which unfolds similarly across
groups (despite differences in timing)?
In an effort to further explore and extend these existing cross-
cultural findings, the current research investigates the magnitude to
which environmental variation (broadly construed) may influence the
developmental trajectory of relational reasoning. To do this, we com-
pare a context in which the culture-specific learning environment
highlights objects and object features (English speakers in the United
States) to another context highlighting relational structure (Mandarin
Chinese speakers in China). For English learners in the United States,
a cultural focus on objects (36, 38) and linguistic focus on learning
nouns (30, 37) may direct children’s attention to objects and object
properties. Conversely, Mandarin learners in China may be subject to
an emphasis on relations that is characteristic of some East Asian cultural
contexts (38, 39) and a linguistic bias toward verbs rather than nouns (40,
41), which could direct their attention toward relations. Accordingly, the
variation between these culture-specific learning environments presents
two natural conditions with which to examine the role of contextual
factors on the development of relational reasoning. We return to con-
sider these and other potential factors in the General Discussion.
To preview our results, in experiment 1 we find that 3-y-olds in
China successfully apply same–different relations in the causal re-
lational reasoning task, while 3-y-olds in the United States perform
at chance. In experiment 2, we provide further evidence for these
differences by examining the developmental trajectory of relational
reasoning performance in Chinese children between 18 and 36 mo.
Specifically, we find that Chinese children maintain high performance
in relational reasoning, in contrast with previous research in the United
States (15), which has found a gradual reduction in performance
during this same developmental window. Finally, in experiment 3, we
reveal different baseline biases in Chinese and American 3-y-olds, who
demonstrate preferences for relational and object-based hypotheses,
respectively. This finding confirms a prediction of the rational learner
account and provides support for the view that cognitive biases un-
derlie the differences in performance observed across contexts.
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of training for each condition (top two rows)
and test trials (bottom row) in experiments 1 and 2.
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Experiment 1: Reasoning in a Relation-Centric Environment
As an initial assessment of culture-specific differences, 3-y-olds in
both cultures completed the causal relational reasoning task de-
veloped by Walker and colleagues (ref. 8, experiment 2; ref. 15,
experiment 1; see Fig. 1). In this task, children observe as four pairs
of blocks are placed on a toy that plays music when “activated.” Two
of the pairs contain identical blocks (“same”) and the other two pairs
contain mismatched blocks (“different”). For children in the same
condition, the toy activates and plays music only when the “same”
pairs are placed on top, while those in the different condition ob-
serve the opposite pattern. Children are then shown novel pairs of
“same” or “different” blocks and asked to choose which pair will
activate the toy; selecting correctly requires that children pick the
pair that is relationally consistent with their training.
Based on the results from previous research, we hypothesized that
3-y-olds in the United States would respond at chance, failing to
infer the abstract same–different relations at test. If 3-y-olds in
China spontaneously succeed on this same task, this would demon-
strate cross-cultural variability in the expression (success vs. failure)
of relational reasoning, support previous accounts of early relational
competence, and provide a cultural testbed in which to evaluate
determining factors in the developmental trajectory.
Results. As predicted, Chinese children consistently selected the
relational pair at an age at which their US counterparts fail to do so.
Three-year-olds in the United States performed at chance in both
same (20/38 correct; two-tailed binomial, P > 0.1) and different (15/38
correct; two-tailed binomial, P > 0.1) conditions, replicating previous
findings (8, 15). In contrast, 3-y-olds in China correctly selected the
test pair that was consistent with their training in both same (28/39
correct; two-tailed binomial, P < 0.01) and different (28/38 correct;
two-tailed binomial, P < 0.01) conditions. Comparing performance
across cultures, we find that Chinese children significantly outperform
children in the United States (two-tailed P < 0.01, Fisher’s exact) in
inferring same–different relations.
Experiment 2: Evidence for Distinct Developmental
Trajectories in Reasoning Across Contexts
The differences in performance reported above might indicate distinct
developmental trajectories of relational reasoning. If so, this would
suggest that early biases toward objects or relations are indeed learned,
and therefore likely to be sensitive to differences in the learning envi-
ronment. Alternatively, children in both groups may follow the same
pattern of development, with 3-y-olds in China lagging (performing
similarly to 18- to 30-mo-olds in the United States) or leading (per-
forming similarly to 4-y-olds in the United States) in the same general
trajectory. To tease these possibilities apart, experiment 2 examines the
development of relational reasoning in Chinese children from 18 to 36
mo—assessing the 1.5-y window before the age assessed in experiment
1. Given the decline in relational reasoning between 18 and 48 mo in
the United States (15), a common trajectory account would predict a
parallel (albeit offset) decline in Chinese children, which would likely
appear within this 18- to 48-mo window.*
Results. Findings of experiment 2 provide evidence for a distinct
developmental trajectory of relational reasoning in China, compared
with previous work conducted in the United States (ref. 15 and Fig.
2). We ran a binomial logistic regression using age (in months),
cultural context (United States, China), and condition (same, dif-
ferent) to predict the likelihood of correctly selecting the relational
response. Cultural context was a significant predictor (β = 3.27; P =
0.05†), and there was a significant interaction of cultural context and
age (β = −0.11; P = 0.01), such that accuracy decreased over the
18- to 48-mo window for children in the United States but was
maintained for those in China, as shown in Fig. 2. There were no
other significant main effects or interactions (but see SI Appendix for
additional analyses considering performance by condition and age).
These findings therefore provide support for distinct paradigms of
relational reasoning across contexts.
Experiment 3: Comparing Object and Relational Focus
Across Contexts
Although the results of experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with an
account in which contextual factors influence whether children
privilege the relational hypothesis, these findings may also be due to
domain-general differences between groups (e.g., executive function,
general attention, motivation, and aptitude; e.g., refs. 18, 19, 38, 42,
and 43). In experiment 3, we discriminate among these possibilities
by testing for baseline differences in bias toward relational or object-
based hypotheses that are predicted to underlie the differences in
performance reported above. Specifically, 3-y-olds in both cultures
were offered a forced choice between a relational and object-based
solution in an ambiguous formulation of the causal relational rea-
soning task in which both hypotheses are supported by the evidence
observed. If the cross-cultural difference reported in experiments 1
and 2 results exclusively from differences in general aptitude, with no
contribution of a bias toward objects or relations, then we should
find no difference in selections across cultures. If, however, culture-
specific features of the learning environment induce a cognitive bias,
we should observe a systematic preference for relational solutions in
China, and a converse preference toward object-based solutions in
the United States.
Children were presented with a different condition, in which one
particular object from the initial causal pair appears again in the second
causal pair (refer to Fig. 3). In this case, it is reasonable to attribute
causality to either the recurring object (e.g., the blue cube) or the
relation (i.e., different). Indeed, previous research with younger US
toddlers using the same training trials indicates that they have no
difficulty selecting the appropriate match when given unambiguous
test choices (i.e., between two relations or two objects), demonstrating
that 18- to 30-mo-olds successfully infer both solution types (44). In
this case, however, training pairs were recombined to form an am-
biguous choice between the test pairs. Specifically, two instances of
the recurring object came together to create a “same” pair—which is
correct with respect to the object hypothesis but incorrect with respect




















Fig. 2. Relational match (1) and nonmatch (0) options selected by 18- to 48-
mo-olds in the United States and China in experiments 1 and 2, plotted with
logistic regression fit lines. US toddler data (blue dots left of the indicator
lines at 36 mo) are fromWalker et al. (ref. 15, experiment 1). Shaded regions
indicate 95% confidence intervals with Loess smoothing.
*In principle, a temporal offset for children in China could also result in a decline in
relational reasoning performance occurring earlier or later than this 18- to 48-mo win-
dow (see General Discussion for a review of this alternative).
†The estimated coefficients (β) are interpretable as log odds but can also be transformed
to an odds ratio (OR = eβ).
























effect also came together, to create a “different” pair—which is cor-
rect with respect to the relational hypothesis and incorrect with re-
spect to the object hypothesis.‡ Due to the constraints of the study
design, it was not possible to present an ambiguous same condition,
and, as a result, we only include a different condition in experiment 3.
Results. Given an ambiguous choice between object and relational
matches, 3-y-olds in the United States selected the object match (36/56;
two-tailed binomial, P = 0.04), while 3-y-olds in China selected the
relational match (41/60; two-tailed binomial, P < 0.01). As predicted,
we also find a significant difference between groups (two-tailed P <
0.01, Fisher’s exact; Fig. 4).
General Discussion
In three experiments, we find that young children in China—unlike
their counterparts in the United States—tend to privilege abstract
same–different relations in a causal learning task. In experiments 1
and 2, children in China were significantly more likely to identify
relational structure and showed no evidence of a decline in reasoning
between 18 and 48 mo. In experiment 3, we tested for the key factor
predicted to mediate these differences, assessing whether children
across contexts exhibit distinct biases to privilege either relational or
object-based solutions. Indeed, we found that in an ambiguous task
with no correct answer, Chinese 3-y-olds favored solutions consistent
with the relational hypothesis, while those in the United States fa-
vored solutions consistent with the contrasting object bias. Together,
these findings suggest that culture-specific learning environments may
bias the early development of relational reasoning to follow different
developmental trajectories.
On the other hand (as noted above), it is conceivable that the U-
shaped trajectory of relational reasoning previously observed in the
United States indeed reflects a cognitive universal, occurring at a
sizable temporal offset for children in China. Given that the re-
gression analysis reported in experiment 2 shows no evidence of a
decline in relational reasoning between 18 and 48 mo in China, the
downward slope would have to occur either after 48 mo or well
before 18 mo (to allow performance to recover). However, given that
the first evidence of children’s ability to infer and act on specific
causal properties from contingency data appears around 16 mo in
the United States (46), a decline seems unlikely to occur much
earlier than 18 mo. Alternatively, cross-cultural differences in
domain-general factors like executive function could drive a lag in
performance and corresponding later decline in relational reasoning
in Chinese children. However, this explanation is at odds with
existing findings demonstrating that preschoolers in both China and
Hong Kong outperform their American counterparts in tasks with
high executive function demands (39, 42, 43). Indeed, variation in
general cognitive maturity is an unlikely explanation for the observed
differences in this task, given that 18- to 30-mo-olds outperform their
3-y-old peers in the United States, despite having comparatively
fewer cognitive resources (15). Other culture-specific differences
could also account for a lagging decline in China, but this too seems
unlikely given the advantages in relational reasoning observed for
older children in some other East Asian cultural contexts, including
3- and 4-y-olds in Hong Kong (39) and 4-y-olds in Japan (38).
Therefore, when considered in light of the previous research, these
data most likely indicate truly distinct developmental trajectories,
shaped by substantive variation across culture-specific learning
environments.
This cross-cultural diversity informs potential sources of bias in
the development of relational reasoning in particular and early
learning in general. That is, children of the same age in different
learning environments may have varying degrees of relational and
object focus, and these differences align with robust population-level
differences in the appearance of relational reasoning. This finding
rules out the proposal that language learning in general produces an
object bias, but is in line with the spirit of Hoyos et al.’s (30) sug-
gestion—that lexical biases may play a role in guiding early relational
reasoning. While particular features of the linguistic context may act
to either hinder or facilitate relational reasoning, there is no need to
characterize this phenomenon as a paradox. Instead, the structures
and features of language may simply serve as a subset of the many
sources of input (culturally specific or otherwise) informing the hy-
potheses that are privileged during early learning.
These findings therefore follow one of the key predictions of the
more general rational learner perspective, by which systematic var-
iation in relational focus could create distinct developmental para-
digms of relational reasoning. Although the current study was not
designed to discriminate between the rational learner and relational
shift accounts, it does provide evidence against a universal de-
velopmental trajectory and may help to explain various inconsis-
tencies in relational ability reported in the existing literature (6–15,
21, 22), including previous cross-cultural findings (38, 39). From this
perspective, variation in relational responding results, in part, from
variation in the learning environment. While this account does not
preclude the possibility of a relational shift, this is only one of many
possible learning trajectories supported by the rational learner ac-
count and may not generalize across learning contexts.
Several questions remain regarding the specific source of the
population differences observed here, and ongoing research is aimed
at further pulling these influences apart. For example, which features
of the culture-specific learning environment are responsible for the
differences in relational reasoning found in the United States and
Fig. 3. Schematic illustration of ambiguous training trial (top row) and test
pairs (bottom row) in experiment 3, in which the evidence was consistent
with both object and relational solutions.
Fig. 4. Proportion of object and relational matches selected by children in
the United States and China in experiment 3. Error bars indicate 95% con-
fidence intervals, and the dotted line represents chance performance. Match
choice differed significantly between groups (*P < 0.01).
‡In this task, both the “object match” and “relational match” pairs are composed entirely
of objects that were associated with the toy activating in the training trials. Because of
this, both test pairs can be interpreted as including an object match, but only one pair
serves as a relational match. From an object matching perspective, there is better evi-
dence for the recurring object (i.e., the blue cube in Fig. 3), as this object was present
both times the toy activated. Previous research from the causal learning literature indi-
cates that preschoolers are sensitive to this type of evidence when making causal attri-
butions (e.g., 45).
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China? One possibility (described above, ref. 30), builds on a sub-
stantive body of research implicating language in the early devel-
opment of relational reasoning (e.g., refs. 17, 27, and 30).
Specifically, the rapid noun spurt that characterizes early English
word learning may induce a temporary bias toward objects and
object properties that interferes with relational reasoning (30). How-
ever, the “noun explosion” that has been documented in English-
language learners is not universal across languages. In Korean, for
instance, there is evidence for a comparable “verb spurt” (47, 48).
Similarly, several studies have found that children learning Mandarin
Chinese produce more verbs than nouns in their spontaneous speech
(both types and tokens), in contrast with English speakers of the
same age, who produce a greater proportion of nouns than verbs
(40). Relatedly, infants learning Mandarin Chinese show fast map-
ping of novel labels for actions, but not for objects, while their
English-learning counterparts demonstrate no such action advan-
tage, mapping novel labels to both actions and objects (41). If an
emphasis on noun learning (relative to other parts of speech) drives
disadvantages in relational reasoning by fostering an object bias (30),
then children learning a more verb-centric language should show an
attenuated or reversed bias. That is, while nouns may direct focus to
object properties, verbs often signal relations across multiple enti-
ties, and might redirect attention accordingly. Indeed, Gopnik et al.
(49) present related evidence for this view in a longitudinal study of
Korean infants. They found that children’s early use of relational
language (verbs in Korean) indicating success or failure (e.g., “an
hay” in Korean or “uh oh” in English) was linked to earlier success in
means–ends problem solving for Korean children relative to their
American peers, who acquire both later in development.
That said, language is just one of many possible sources of input
that influence a rational learner’s prior expectations, and other
cultural factors may also drive a bias toward relational or object-
based solutions. In particular, there are well-documented differ-
ences in holistic and analytic processing (and relatedly, collectivist
and individualist cognitive styles) across cultures, which may simi-
larly result in an emphasis on relationships between entities or on
characteristics of individual entities (e.g., refs. 50 and 51). More
broadly, environmental variation across these learning contexts (e.g.,
socioeconomic status, number of siblings, and pedagogical and child-
rearing practices; see refs. 52–54) may differentially affect general
cognitive skills that are known to influence relational reasoning, like
executive function (18, 19, 42). Although our samples were drawn
from communities with similar demographics (i.e., urban, middle
class neighborhoods near major universities), ongoing research aims
to tease apart these possible influences by comparing the develop-
ment of relational reasoning in more closely matched populations
[e.g., northern and southern Italy, where children with a shared
linguistic context but variation in culture and social class show cor-
responding differences in holistic processing (55)].
Regardless of which specific features of the learning environment
are ultimately responsible for these effects, the current findings
demonstrate that 3-y-olds certainly have the capacity to infer re-
lational properties, providing additional evidence that the observed
object bias is acquired after early competence in relational reasoning
is achieved (in the United States). Critically, this work demonstrates
spontaneous success on same–different reasoning in 3-y-olds. This
stands in contrast to previous research, which has concluded that
children at this age require additional scaffolding to solve this task
(e.g., refs. 15 and 17). Further, we show that early deficiencies in re-
lational reasoning are more likely to result from a difference in ten-
dency, rather than a difference in ability. More broadly, we have
established naturally occurring population-level differences in re-
lational focus that appear early in development and predict qualitative
differences in the trajectory of relational reasoning.
Methods
Experiment 1.
Participants. A total of 153 36- to 48-mo-olds participated in experiment 1,
including 76 native English speakers [mean (M) = 41.9 mo; 36 female] in the
United States and 77 native Mandarin speakers (M = 41.2 mo; 36 female) in
China. Sample size satisfies a power analysis with power >0.8, given an alpha
of 0.05 and an effect size of 0.3 (medium). An additional three participants
were excluded due to experimenter error (1), failure to complete the study
(1), or interference by another child (1). All procedures were approved by
the Institutional Review Board at the University of California, San Diego
(UCSD) (151866) and informed consent was obtained for all participants
(experiments 1–3). Toddlers in the United States were recruited and tested at
preschools, museums, and in the laboratory at UCSD (with comparable per-
formance across testing locations) and toddlers in China were recruited and
tested at preschools. Both samples were composed of children living in large
cities, recruited in and around major universities (UCSD in La Jolla, CA and
Zhejiang Normal University in Jinhua, Zhejiang Province). We did not collect
specific demographic information. However, participants were recruited from
institutions serving middle-class urban communities. Additionally, Chinese par-
ticipants were likely only children, owing to Chinese family-planning policies.
Half of the children in each group were randomly assigned to same or different
conditions. In all settings, children were tested individually in a private room.
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure replicated Walker et al.
(ref. 15, experiment 1), with the exception that instructions for Chinese
participants were given in Mandarin Chinese. The original English instruc-
tions were independently translated and back-translated by English–Mandarin
bilinguals in China and the United States to ensure accuracy. Different ex-
perimenters (residents of each country and native speakers of the testing
language) performed the task in the United States and China, following the
same procedures and training, and were blind to the specific cross-cultural
predictions motivating the study design.
Children were seated at a table across from the experimenter. Before
beginning the task, the experimenter led the child in a brief warm-up activity,
which involved interacting with several small toys and served to familiarize
the child with the experimenter. After this, the experimenter placed a total of
four pairs of same and different painted wooden blocks (two pairs of each
relation) on top of an opaque cardboard box, which appeared to activate and
play music in response to some pairs of blocks but not others. In fact, the
experimenter activated a wireless doorbell inside the box by surreptitiously
pressing a button. Depending upon their condition, children either observed
evidence that same or different pairs were causal. Then, at test, all children
were presented with two new pairs—one same, one different—and asked to
point to the pair that would make the toy play music. The experimenter
recorded children’s first point or reach. A schematic of the procedure for
experiment 1 appears in Fig. 1; however, the order of presentation of all
blocks was randomized and the side of presentation of the test pairs was
counterbalanced. See SI Appendix for a detailed script of the procedure.
Experiment 2.
Participants. A total of 80 Chinese toddlers participated in experiment 2, all of
whomwere nativeMandarin speakers tested in China. Each group of toddlers
included 40 participants, with toddlers in the younger group aged 18 to 30mo
(±1 mo;M = 23.1 mo; 15 female) and those in the older group aged 30 to 36
mo (±1 mo; M = 33.1 mo; 20 female). Sample size was matched to the US
data reported in Walker et al. (15). An additional three children were tested
but excluded as a result of experimenter error (1) or failure to complete the
study (2). Recruitment and populations were the same as those for Chinese
participants in experiment 1.
Materials and procedure.Materials and procedure were identical to experiment 1.
Experiment 3.
Participants. A total of 116 3-y-olds participated in experiment 3, including 60
native Mandarin speakers in China (M = 41.0 mo; 31 female) and 56 native
English speakers in the United States (M = 41.4 mo; 21 female). An addi-
tional 12 children were tested but excluded as a result of experimenter error
(9), failure to complete the study (1), or parent interference (2). Recruitment
procedures and populations were the same as those used in experiment 1,
except that US toddlers were recruited at preschools and museums and not
in the laboratory at UCSD.
Materials and procedure. Materials were identical to those used in experiment
1, and the procedure closely resembled the different condition, but with the
modifications illustrated in Fig. 3 to create an ambiguous causal structure,
presenting evidence for both relational and object-based hypotheses. To
accomplish this, one particular block (e.g., the blue cube in Fig. 3) was re-
peated in both activating different pairs. At test, children chose between two
possible solutions: (i) a “same” pair including the object match (e.g., two blue
cubes) or (ii) a “different” pair that follows the relational rule by combining
the two blocks that were previously associated with the effect (e.g., the yellow
sphere and red pyramid in Fig. 3). This design presented children with a forced
choice between an object match and the relational match.
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